Rethinking market indices
Ever since Charles Dow and Edward Jones launched their Industrial Average equity index back in 1896, the use of market indices has been on the increase in the investment management industry. It is a practical means to capture the price trend of the market as a whole, whereby the index basket serves as an investable proxy for the Market Portfolio.
Cornerstone in the Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model CAPM (see Sharpe [1964] ), the Market Portfolio is said to be mean-variance efficient in theory. The question, raised in the 1970s (see e.g. Roll [1977] and Ross [1977] ), however is whether the market index in the way it is constructed is efficient in this sense. If it is not, Roll and Ross [1994] argue, the use of such indices as benchmarks in an investment process is suboptimal.
The debate in the literature had started on equity indices initially and has spilled over to fixedincome as well. Bond indices, first launched by Standard and Poor's in 1926 , are criticised on the same basis, by Siegel [2003] among others, who sees an inefficiency in the what-he-calls bums problem: since securities are weighed by the size of debt, the deepest indebted entities tend to be overweight. This problem has surfaced during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. The near-collapse of indebted Greece and the contagion to other peripheral countries has made the use of debt-weighted benchmarks unpopular and has revived the search for alternative smart benchmarks.
The fruits of this research are discussed in next section. The studies that have been carried out are of interest in that they reveal a sense of market inefficiency; they give empirical evidence of a systematic outperformance of smart indices over the value-weighted market index, which is a direct challenge to the fundaments of finance theory. The evidence leads to believe that there may be an elemental problem in the habitual specification of the Market Portfolio. If the value-weighted index is inefficient, value weighting is inefficient. Much can be learned from the alternative weighting schemes that have been tried. What is more, the work done on equity indices can be seen as complementary to the research based on Fama and French' [1992] seminal paper, where additional risk factors are tried within the CAPM modelling framework.
The additional factors that are found may have their origin in the deficiency of the market factor to which they have been tested.
Interestingly the smart indices that have been proposed, all take out the market price from the weighting schemes. The efficiency hypothesis of the Market Portfolio is based on the supposition that all assets traded on the market are in price equilibrium at all times. It gives no consideration to liquidity issues or other reasons for price distortions. Showing that removing the price from the market specification systematically improves the return-to-risk profile, which reveals an inefficiency, is a novel way to give proof that the pricing anomaly issues are real.
Upon this premise we pursue the research on alternative market indices in this paper. We do this for the bond markets, on which little has been explored to date compared to equities. This paper starts by a short review of the literature and practice of alternative indexing, in section 2. In section 3 we set out the ideas which we put to the test, on empirical data described in section 4 and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Review of the literature and investment practice
Three alternative approaches to building market indices have been developed over the last years. One of them, the simplest, is taking an equal weighting scheme. All assets traded on a market are being assigned an equal weight. Benartzi and Thaler [2001] describe the merits of this scheme, which they call the one-over-N approach. DeMiguel et al. [2009] show, on equity data, that it beats a large set of indices constructed differently including the classical valueweighted index. However, their results can be ascribed to certain features in their test dataset. Kritzman et al. [2010] show the fallacy of one-over-N when applied on markets with small and illiquid securities.
A second category of alternative indices takes a fundamental approach. Assets are weighed by fundamental characteristics that serve as a proxy for size. Such weighting scheme can be applied on an aggregate country level, or alternatively, within a country on a security level.
On a country level, international indices are on offer by data providers which are weighed by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). MSCI launched its GDP-weighted world equity index back in 1988, with the primary motive at the time to counter the large position of Japan. The argument was to avoid over-representing countries with a high ratio of listed companies over unlisted companies. The equity price crash in Japan shortly thereafter revealed that there may have also been an overpricing effect at the origin of Japan's large position.
GDP-weighted bond indices were first marketed in 2009 by Pimco, and by Barclays Capital who wanted at the launch to equilibrate the weight between developed and developing world debt. Bruder et al. [2011] give evidence that the GDP-weighted indices tend to be superior in terms of performance to debt-weighted indices. Researchers, e.g. Serrat et al. [2011] , as well as practitioners, such as Barclays Capital and MTS, propose refinements to the GDP approach for bond indices. Weights are adjusted by making use of certain national accounting statistics to further improve the performance. This approach is called fiscal strength-, or macro weighting. Those adjustments can be seen as attempts to include considerations of solvency into the weighting scheme. It makes sense: rather than size, the capacity to reimburse debts is taken as a criterion for judging the importance of a country.
On a security level, Research Affiliates first built fundamentally-weighted equity and bond indices, known as the RAFI indices, based on their publication "Fundamental Indexation", see Arnott et al. [2005] . With reference to earlier debate on the noise-in-price problem (see Poterba and Summers [1988] A third category of alternative indices takes a risk-based approach. Maillard et al. [2010] propose the principle of risk parity, an equal-weighting scheme in terms of risk contribution rather than firm size. The idea is to weigh firms by the extent to which they participate in the market equilibrium pricing process. In practical terms, risk contribution is measured by means of price volatilities and correlation structure between the assets. Another risk-based approach is a weighting scheme that minimises the price volatility, called the minimum-variance approach. Haugen and Baker [1991] show it to structurally outperform the market index.
Yet other risk-based approaches have been proposed for equities such as the maximum diversification scheme by Choueifaty and Coignard [2008] or the risk-budgeting approach by Bruder and Roncalli [2012] . Demey et al. [2012] give an overview. In all, risk-based indexing deploys systematic asset allocation strategies giving a fixed reference point for investment managers. They have little relation though with the market index in its purpose to reflect the general market price trend. Risk-based investment is, to give an interpretation, a remedy to passive benchmark strategies based on a flawed index. The investment trend is becoming increasingly popular among equity fund managers, as reports Russo [2013] .
Research approach
Of the three approaches to index building discussed in previous section, the fundamental approach seems to us the most adept, in the sense that it directly tackles the problems that have been identified in the standard indices. Taking valuation-indifferent asset values eliminates the non-informative price noise, as mentioned in previous section, and in the same time it resolves the bums problem in bond indices, as weights no longer depend on debt size. Arnott et al. [2005 Arnott et al. [ , 2010 were the first to bring these arguments forward and try fundamental indexing on bonds. Our study builds on their work.
Rather than taking a set of accounting measures, as they do, to determine the firm weights, we take a single measure, namely the sales revenues. We do this for two reasons. The first reason is data related. Sales revenues are relevant and easy to interpret in all types of economic activity, and are for that reason directly comparable between firms. Moreover data on revenues are easy to acquire compared to other accounting data. For the pertinence of the tests we reckon that data loss is to be avoided. To give a ballpark figure, Arnott et al. [2010] report to lose 16% of their test bed because of missing data, whereas our loss is less than 3%.
The second reason why we measure firm size by a single accounting measure is a more conceptual one. By no means do we intend to appraise the financial condition of a firm. That would be a different exercise. We want to measure firm size using a relatively objective criterion. Our test purpose is to see if the flaw in the value-weighted indices can be resolved through fundamental indexing and this without introducing any new elements. Following this logic through to sovereign debt, we carry out tests weighing countries by their Gross Domestic Product. More sophisticated weighing schemes, e.g. macro weighting, are interesting in itself but are, again, a different exercise beyond the scope of this paper.
We build fundamentally-weighted bond indices and compare them in empirical tests to their value-weighted counterparts, in order to establish the relative performance behaviour. We do this in the Eurozone, on a country level for sovereign debt and on a firm level for corporate debt. We test on existing indices built by data providers. We adopt their constituent definition and the bond selection criteria inherent to that. We are aware that by doing this Roll's [1977] critique is not addressed, who argued that the inefficiency of the Market Portfolio found in tests greatly stems from the incompleteness of the proxies that are being used. Indeed indices are sub-selections meant to be representative for the complete market. Our tests therefore give relative results, determining whether fundamental weighting is more efficient than value weighting within the existing bond screening processes.
Only the index weighting schemes are modified in the tests. For the corporate index the debt structure is kept intact and this on the most consolidated firm holding level. The relative (value) weights of the bonds issued by the same holding are thus conserved. The sole modification is when, once a year, the weights between the firms are reset to the sales revenues. The rest of the time the weights evolve in accordance with the price movements, in the same way as for value-weighted indices. The turnover is kept low in this way. The extra turnover provoked by the annual rebalancing to revenues is around 15% on an annual basis. The firms' annual sales revenues have been retrieved from Bloomberg. A second data provider, Factset, has been called in for the purpose of data checking and to fill a few missing gaps. We have made use of Reuters to establish the link between the bonds and the issuing firms. Certain manual adjustments were necessary to deal with corporate actions in a way that data is timely yet foresight-free. A few isolated cases of negative revenues have been discarded. We eventually obtained a data coverage exceeding 97% of the index members.
Data and index construction
The annual revenue figures correspond to fiscal years, which are in Europe for the largest part, 89%, calendar years, and are made public after the year's close in January or February.
Given this situation we set the fundamental weights once a year in March on the basis of the last-reported revenues. The small time-lag for the few firms that publish their accounts in other periods has been ignored. 
Empirical tests

Corporate debt
Let us start by comparing the performance of the fundamentally-weighted index with that of the value-weighted index over the five-year test period. The fundamental index outperforms steadily, as can be seen in Exhibit 1. It outperforms by 0.8% per annum and that with a same volatility level at 4.2%. These results are comparable to those of Arnott et al. [2010] on the US corporate debt market from 1997 to 2009, and add to the evidence that the value-weighted market proxy may not be mean-variance efficient. We compare the makeup of the two indices to see to what the outperformance is due. In Exhibit 2 the economic sector weights are given of the two indices. Its shows a substantial shift in weight: the overlap between the two indices in temrs of weight is 40%. By construction the weight shifts away from the deepest indebted firms, which are the banks as can be seen in the Exhibit. The banking sector having underperformed considerably over the period, it is this weight shift which explains the largest part of the outperformance.
Exhibit 1 Performance of the fundamental-and value-weighted index
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Fundamental weighting clearly reduces the bums problem in this empirical test.
Within each sector the makeup changes as well when modifying the weights, again shifting away from relatively indebted firms. In an additional test where the shift between sectors is separated from the shift within sectors, we find that the impact of the latter is small. Thus, it is less important to apply a fundamental weighting scheme on the individual firms of a sector than it is on the sectors as a whole. This makes sense. As the performance of bonds issued by firms that are in the same economic activity tends to be similar, reweighing them has less effect on their aggregate performance.
It is surprising that the fundamental index has not been spared in the heat of the banking crisis in 2008. The drawdown of 5% after Lehman's collapse was as severe as for the market index.
This observation seems to suggest that fundamental indexing doesn't protect against extreme market events. Lastly, we look whether the outperformance can be attributed in part to the extra turnover that is generated by the annual rebalancing towards the revenue levels. Perold [2007] , Blitz and Swinkels [2008] see this rebalancing turnover as the essential source of outperformance for fundamental indexing applied on equities. Indeed there is an implicit contrarian investment strategy in the rebalancing process when assets that have appreciated over the year are being sold and ones that have depreciated are bought. It cumulates to an outperformance if prices are mean reverting. We find that in our test this is not the case. When we increase the rebalancing frequency from annually to quarterly and monthly the outperformance of the fundamental index diminishes. This is an important point. It tells that the price noise is not the main issue for bond indices; it is before all the bums problem.
Exhibit 2 Economic sector weights
Sovereign debt
Turning to sovereigns, in Exhibit 4 the performance of the GDP-weighted Eurozone government bond index is compared to that of the market-weighted equivalent. Its outperformance, which starts to cumulate in the sovereign debt crisis as can be seen in the Exhibit, adds once more to the evidence that market weighting is inefficient. It is to us the most obvious example. Fundamental weighting reduces the weight of the peripheral countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), their aggregate GDP being inferior to their debt, as can be seen in Exhibit 5, where the debt-to-GDP ratios are given of the member states as of December 2011.
Exhibit 4 Performance of the GDP-weighted and value-weighted index
Data source: Barclays Capital. Calculations made by the authors. Total returns are given in index level starting at 100.
The financial situation of the peripheral countries has declined progressively over the observation period, which is one explanation as to why the performance of the marketweighted index has been lagging in a progressive manner as well. But it is before all the perception of the financial situation and of the consequences in terms of investment risk which has led to the gradual diversion in bond prices between the core-and the peripheral countries. We reckon that the extensive use of the market-weighted index as benchmark by market participants has played a role in this. The fact that this index is generally considered to provide a neutral exposure to the bond market as a whole, leads to a semi-automatic purchase of bonds as soon as they are included in the index. In this situation, if an indebted country issues yet another bond, the demand for this bond may be such that the risks related to the added leverage may not be priced in. 
Conclusion
Fundamental indexation is proving an effective alternative for representing the bond markets.
The philosophy is different from that of the longstanding market-weighted indices.
Importance is being given to the role bond issuers play in the real economy rather than to their presence on the capital markets. By this more attention is paid to the capacity to take on debt and to eventually reimburse, which is an alternative appreciation of what the market stands for. The core of the question is to what degree entities participate in the market equilibrium pricing process. Is debt size the determinant factor or is it the economic activity that is financed by the debt?
The recent experience over the debt crisis in Europe indicates that debt size may not always be an effective reference point. On the sovereign bond market the high leverage of Greece was not expressed in the prices until late. Had the reference point been its domestic product there would perhaps not have been such appetite for Greek bonds, as its weight in the index would have been tiny and disconnected to its mounting debt. In the same way this could be argued for the banking sector within the corporates indices. How would banks have faired in the 2000s if they would have not been able to count on a semi-automatic demand for new issues due to massive market-index trading?
There are signs that in recent years investment practice is starting to adapt. An increasing number of alternative smart indices are being developed as well as investment products that are based on them. Those innovations are destined for equity investing mainly in today's markets. This paper adds arguments why it should involve fixed-income investing equally well.
1 This is a global phenomenon. We have verified this on the Merrill Lynch Global Corporate Investment Grade index over the same test period.
